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COMMENTS
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AND CONTROL OF
NEW MEDIA TECHNIQUES: IN SEARCH
OF THE "SUBLIMINAL TORT"
The history of the common law has been characterized by a
gradual expansion of recognized protectable interests. While injured parties no longer need to fit their claims within rigid forms
of pleading, they must still bring their claims within recognized
causes of action.1 These claims inevitably encompass an ever
widening array of behavior. 2 The final stage of this process is
often a newly recognized interest with its own cause of action: a
3
new tort.
The twentieth century has put a severe strain on the process of creating new torts in two ways. First, modern science
has created new types of harm 4 which do not fit neatly into existing causes of action. 5 As a result, a remarkable number of
1. See generally MArrLAND, FORMS OF ACTION 196 (1936). The liberali-

zation of pleading may have been more a matter of form than substance.
See Wilson, Writs v. Rights: An Unended Contest, 18 MICH. L. REV. 255
(1920).
2. This process may be illustrated by the development of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Originally, recovery for mental
distress was only permitted when incident to an independent tort. E.g.,
Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925) (incident to
false imprisonment); Trogdon v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916) (incident to assault). An early exception to this rule permitted recovery for
mental distress caused when a common carrier insulted a passenger. E.g.,
Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899). This exception came to apply when a prospective passenger had not yet bought a
ticket. E.g., St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 P. 779
(1924).
3. One example is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
which is now independently recognized and no longer needs to be pleaded
as an incident of another tort. Compare Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex.
16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (action for mental distress based on over zealous
efforts of collection company) with cases cited in note 2 supra.
4. These new harms include chemical and nuclear toxins in the environment, noise pollution, and computer record keeping which has posed a
new threat to privacy.
5. Persons injured by defective products, for example, originally based
their claims on the fiction of an "implied warranty." The use of this concept
to obtain relief was called "pernicious and unnecessary" and was eventually largely disregarded when product liability based on strict liability was
recognized as an independent tort. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960).
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new causes of action have been created. 6 Second, modern science has identified with new precision the psychological and
physiological effect of these harms. 7 This alone has expanded
the number of recognized protectable interests.
A new type of harm created by modern science resulted
from the invention of techniques to influence a person's
thoughts, moods, and behavior without his awareness. This influence is accomplished by transmission of information
designed to be perceived subconsciously, and not consciously.
This comment finds that there is a right to be free from such
influence and examines the degree to which the law has recognized the subconscious as a protectable interest. How the law
has protected this interest is considered and a proposal is made
for the creation of a new tort.
THE PROBLEM

Modern society, with its attendant advantages, has also bred
noxious gases and odors, discomforting and dangerous noises,
and unpleasant sights.8 Aside from these incidental sensory assaults, modern society has produced an assault of informational
data. Each day we are exposed to an unprecedented avalanche
of advertising and other information designed to influence our
attitudes and behavior. The invention of techniques for the
mass dissemination of sound and pictures may be the most culturally significant technological change of the twentieth century.9 Consequently, the common law has been challenged to
determine when media assaults are actionable.
Actionable media assaults naturally fall into two categories:
6. The right to privacy, the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and product liability based on strict liability were all created in the twentieth century. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
7. See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and EmotionalDisturbancein the Law of

Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936) (examining the evolution of the law's
sensitivity to the psychological aspects of emotional distress).
8. Such evils may cause compensable injuries through the concept of
"private nuisance." See, e.g., McClung v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 255
Ala. 302, 51 So. 2d 371 (1951); Kosich v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 136 N.J. Eq.
571, 43 A.2d 15 (1945).
9. See generally M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964). This
technological change is a continuing process, and as such represents a continuing problem. See Columbia Broadcasting, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1972) ('The problems of regulation are rendered
more difficult because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so
now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.").
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patent assaults and subliminal assaults.' 0 Patent assaults are
those which are consciously perceived, and may be offensive either because of their content" or because of the manner in
which they are broadcast. 12 Subliminal assaults include "[any
technique whereby an attempt is made to convey information
. .by transmitting messages below the threshold of normal
awareness."' 3 Subliminal communications are necessarily assaults and are in and of themselves offensive.
*

Subliminal communication is prima facie offensive 14 because it violates the fundamental principle of personal autonomy.' 5 This principle states that an individual's identity and
sense of self worth are threatened when his behavior is manipulated or controlled by others. 16 When subliminal communication
10. This distinction seems logically compelled, but has not been judicially recognized.
11. Finding content offensive raises first amendment issues. These
cases often involve "obscene" matter. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (a statute enabling persons to delete their
names from a mailing list used to send advertising of a sexually provocative
nature held constitutional). But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" was constitutionally protected behavior).
12. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (ordinance making it illegal to
drive a sound truck emitting raucous noises was constitutional); Guarina v.
Bogart, 407 Pa. 307, 180 A.2d 557 (1962) (noise from drive-in movie theater
held to be a nuisance).
13. Code, National Association of Radio-T.V. Broadcasters,revision of
1958, quoted in In re Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception" Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 17 (1974), and B. KEY, THE CLAMPLATE ORGY 134 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CLAM-PLATE]. Subliminal assaults include patent information that is designed to have a subliminal effect. See notes 41-55, and accompanying text infra. See also Shevrin &
Dickman, The Psychological Unconscious, 35 Am.PSYCHOLOGIST 421 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as The Psychological Unconscious] (discussing techniques for transmitting information that is in different degrees patent, but
nevertheless designed to circumvent conscious awareness).
14. A prima facie presumption is not conclusive. BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 987 (3d ed. 1969).
15. "[Tlhe general moral principle of personal autonomy ... [is] that
forcing individuals to do what they do not wish to do, or preventing them
from doing what they wish to do is primafacie wrong." Shapiro, Legislating
The Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 253 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Behavior Control].
16. In democratic societies, there is a fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual, his basic dignity and worth as a human being, and in the need to maintain social processes that safeguard his
sacred individuality. Psychologists and sociologists have linked the development and maintenance of this sense of individuality to the human
need for autonomy-the desire to avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by others.
Westin, Science, Privacy,and Freedom. Issues and ProposalsFor the
1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022 (1966). See also Gross, The Concept
of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34, 38 (1967).
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is used to affect an individual's behavior without his awareness,
the principle of personal autonomy is violated.
Subliminal communication also violates the related principle of mental privacy.' 7 This principle protects mentation,
8
which includes a person's thoughts, moods, and perceptions.'
Accordingly, it is prima facie wrong to effect substantial
changes in a person's mentation against his will. 19 The right to
20
be free from such changes is justified on purely moral grounds,
and is intrinsic to the notion of a free society. 21 The right also
22
derives from the Constitution.
Subliminal communication violates the principle of mental
privacy because it seeks to make changes in a person's mentation against his will. Subliminal information is perceived only
subconsciously and is intended to evade the mind's critical re17. See Note, Mental Privacy: An InternationalSafeguard to Governmental Intrusions Into Mental Processes, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 110, 118-19
(1975). See also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979);
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The right of privacy is
broad enough to include the right to protect one's mental processes from
governmental interference."); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,
Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), reprinted
in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973). ("If one is not protected in his thoughts,
behavior, personality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless.") Id. at 2064.
18. "Mentation" refers to any mental activity outside of the regulation of
the body's autonomic functions. Behavior Control, supra note 15, at 246
n.14, 253 n.42. The concept of mentation includes the mental activities of the
subconscious. Id. at 261 n.68.
19. Behavior Control, supra note 15, at 253.
20. Id. See also Ruebhausen and Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral'
Research, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1185-88 (1965).
21. " Wlithout freedom of thought there can be no free society." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect .... They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
("Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."). Mental privacy has also been
explained as a first amendment protection. The rationale is that the first
amendment protects communication, and mentation is a necessary antecedent of communication. "The First Amendment ... honors the sanctity of
thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are
important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone." Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
also Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir.
Ct. Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973), reprintedin 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2064
(July 31, 1973). ("[I]f the First Amendment protects the freedom to express
ideas, it necessarily follows that it must protect the freedom to generate
ideas. Without the latter protection, the former is meaningless.").
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sources. 23 Once a person has subconsciously perceived subliminal information his thoughts, moods, and behavior can be
influenced without his awareness. Employees' attitudes regarding their jobs, 24 a shopper's purchasing decisions,25 and even a

voter's choice of candidate 26 are potential targets. Such influence is clearly offensive because it is antithetical to the fundamental American principle of a free society.
That the subconscious mind can be a media target is an idea
new to the twentieth century. 27 That such media targeting can
influence attitudes and behavior make this area ripe for social
concern and judicial attention. Before the legal implications of
subliminal communication can be discussed, it must first be
shown which subliminal techniques are being used.
Three Subliminal Techniques
Subliminal Sounds and Images
Subliminal sounds and images are those stimuli transmitted
below the threshold of conscious perception. 2 8 The principle behind this technique is that sensory data which may be too dim,
too silent, or too distorted to be registered consciously will nev23. See generally CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 19-20, 83-104; The Psychological Unconscious, supra note 13, at 426-30.
24. Case history, Southern Bell Telephone Co. of Kentucky - Study of
Employee Reactions to Muzak (study available to potential customers from
Muzak Corp.).
25. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra.
26. Apparently, subliminal techniques have already been used in campaign literature. See CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 150-53 (use in Canadian
election); Media Images of Alcohol: The Effects of Advertising and Other
Media On Alcohol Abuse, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism
and Narcotics of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States
Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1976) (use in one United States Congressional campaign). See also TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71 (politicans sought use
of subliminal sounds technique).
27. See Reed, Jr. & Coalson, Jr., Eighteenth-Century Legal Doctrine
Meets Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: F.T.C. Regulation of Emotionally ConditioningAdvertising, 11 GA. L. REv. 733, 741-44 (1972). [Hereinafter cited as Reed & Coalson]. But see N.F. DIXON, SUBLIMINAL
PERCEPTION 4-10 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as DIXON] (early philosophers

such as Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus recognized the idea that people
may be affected by stimuli of which they are not aware).
28. See note 13 supra. The Canadian Radio-Television Commission defines a "subliminal device" as
[A] technical device that is used to convey or attempt to convey a
message to a person by means of images or sounds of very brief duration or by any other means without that person being aware that such a
device is being used or being aware of the substance of the message
being conveyed or attempted to be conveyed.
CLAM-PLATE, note 13 supra, at 146 (citing the CRTC Amendment to the Television Broadcasting Regulations).
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ertheless be perceived subconsciously. Once perceived subcon29
sciously these stimuli can affect behavior.
This technique takes several forms. In one variant, a voice,
speaking too softly to be consciously audible, gives a simple verbal command.3 0 This variant is currently being employed in supermarkets 31 and department stores3 2 to reduce shoplifting. To
do so, a voice inaudibly whispers and repeats: "I am honest. I
will not steal. ' 33 Stores using this technique report substantial
34
reduction in theft losses.
In the second variant, a picture or written command is
35
flashed during the showing of a film or a television program.
The image is flashed for such a brief duration that the viewer is
unaware it is shown. One famous use of this technique occurred
during the showing of a television commercial for "Husker-Do,"
a children's game. During this commercial several subliminal
flashes of the phrase "Get-it!" were shown. These flashes were
apparently perceptible to some viewers because the Federal
Communications Commission received complaints. In response, the Commission issued a public notice 36 affirming its position that "broadcasts employing such techniques are contrary
29. The Psychological Unconscious, supra note 13, at 426-30. That subliminal techniques can affect behavior has long been established by clinical
tests. See Dixon, The Effect of Subliminal Stimulation Upon Autonomic and
Verbal Behavior, 57 J. ABNORM. SOC. PSYCH. 29 (1958). More recently, subliminal techniques have been used to modify the behavior of hospitalized
schizophrenics. Silverman, Levinson, Mendelsohn, Ungaro, & Bronstein, A
Clinical Application of Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation, 161 J. NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 379 (1975). These techniques have also been
used commercially. For a discussion regarding their use in movies, see
CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 90; TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71. For a discussion
regarding their use in broadcast media see In re Broadcast of Information
by Means of "Subliminal Perception" Techniques, 44 F.C.C. 2d 1016 (1974);
In re Use of "Subliminal Perception" Advertising by Television Stations, 40
F.C.C. 10 (1957); In re "Subliminal" Advertising, 40 F.C.C. 7 (1957).
30. This technique has been clinically proven to affect conscious
thought. Mykel, Emergence of Unreported Stimuli Into Imagery As A Function of Laterality of Presentation (1976) (unpublished doctoral thesis in
Georgia State University - School of Arts and Sciences, Order No. 77-2932, 92
pages).
31. Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 25.
32. TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71; MONEY, Sept. 1978, at 24.
33. MONEY, Sept. 1978, at 24; Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 25; OMM, Feb.
1981, at 45-49, 107.
34. One supermarket owner reported pilferage costs went from $50,000
every six months down to $13,000. Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 25. One department store chain reported cutting thefts by 37% for a saving of $600,000
during a nine month trial. TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71; MONEY, Sept. 1978, at
24.
35. In re Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception"
Techniques, 44 F.C.C. 2d 1016 (1974).
36. Id.
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to the public interest. ' 37 As a consequence, the use of subliminal techniques in broadcast media is prohibited.
A third variant involves still photographs, such as magazine
advertisements, in which "embeds" are hidden. Embeds are extraneous words or images designed to be subconsciously perceived, and can be detected only with study 38 or special
equipment. 39 They operate in still pictures in the same way as
brief flashes work in moving pictures. To obtain maximum psychological impact on the subconscious, the images must have
high emotional value. Often their content is sexual.40
Emotional Conditioning

Emotional conditioning is a familiar advertising technique
by which products are associated with emotions unrelated to
their use.41 This is illustrated by a television commercial for
"Vivarin," a stimulant drug whose active ingredient is ordinary
caffeine. In the commercial, a housewife describes her life
before and after the use of Vivarin. Before use, she tells us, her
life was an emotional vacuum. She bored her husband and
37. Id. at 1017.
38. See generally CLAM-PLATE, note 13 supra, at 20-23, 29-34. This book
contains enlargements of some common magazine advertisements showing
embeds. The author hypothesizes that embeds can be inserted during the
process of putting together numerous photographs to make one composite
photograph, and by the use of photo retouching techniques. Id. at 21, 31.
While the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has not commented on the use
or existence of embeds, it recognizes the use of composite photographs and
photo retouching. See Howard & Hulbert, Advertising and the Public Interest, V-8-9 (staff report to the FTC, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Howard & Hulbert]. Regarding the ability of the subconscious to perceive embeds see A.
EHRENZWEIG, THE HIDDEN ORDER OF ART

32-46 (1976). See also

DIXON,

supra note 27, at 124-26 (describing psychological studies noting subliminal
sensitivity to embeds).
39. Embeds of distorted images may require special equipment to be
viewed normally. One particularly ingenious version of this technique involves photographing an image on a curved reflective surface. The resultant distortion can be corrected by viewing the image on an
anamorphoscope, which is a vertical cylindrical mirror. FUNK & WAGNALL'S
STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 53 (1966). See also F. LEEMAN, HIDDEN
IMAGES 9, 105-34 (1976) (containing examples and the materials for constructing an anamorphoscope and finding that such distortions are found in
many paintings made during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
Apparently, such distortions are perceived and decoded subconsciously.
CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 167-78.
40. See generally CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 20-23.
41. This conditioning occurs precisely as it did with Pavlov's famous
dogs: as the sound of a bell automatically initiated their salivation, so the
sight of a product instantly conjures the unrelated emotion, thereby stimulating a sale. See J. ENGEL, D. KOLLAT, &R. BLACKWELL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 230 (2d ed. 1973) ("Classical conditioning probably explains much of
advertising effect .... "). See generally Reed & Coalson, supra note 27, at
745-48. It has been clinically established that classical conditioning can affect not only behavior (such as salivating) but can also affect attitudes.
Staats & Staats, Attitudes Established by Classical Conditioning, 57 J.
ABNORM. Soc. PSYCH. 37 (1958).
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bored herself. Now, after use of Vivarin, her life is more exciting
and her marriage, sex life, and personality have all improved.4
With repeated exposures to this commercial, viewers are
conditioned to associate Vivarin with a more exciting life. This
conditioning is subliminal in the sense that viewers, although
consciously aware of the commercial, are unaware of the conditioning. The conditioning lasts long after the commercial is consciously forgotten,4 3 and may influence behavior weeks or even
months later.44 While rational viewers know that Vivarin cannot
make life exciting, the commercial is nonetheless effective. This
phenomenon has been judicially recognized 45 and has been the
subject of much scholarly attention. 6
FunctionalMusic
Functional music is best known by the trademark of its largest producer, Muzak. It is designed by psychologists to achieve
47
specific psychological and physiological changes in listeners.
42. J.B. Williams Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19, 671 (proposed complaint). In the printed version of the same advertisement, the housewife after using Vivarin, said: "All of a sudden Jim was
coming home to a more exciting woman, me. We talk to each other a lot
more than we have in years .

.

. [a]nd after dinner I was wide awake

enough to do a little bit more than just look at television." Id. See also
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 587 (D.D.C. 1971)
(case concerned with the regulation of tobacco advertisements) ('The Salem girl was in fact a seductive merchant of death-f[and] .

.

. the real

'Marlboro Country' is the graveyard.") (Wright, J. dissenting).
43. Reed &Coalson, supra note 27, at 745-48 (citing psychological studies.)
44. Id. Therefore, whether a commercial is consciously memorable may
be irrelevant to the commercial's ability to stimulate sales. Ironically, the
less seriously a commercial is perceived, the more effective it is in conditioning behavior. See T. SCHWARTZ, THE RESPONSIVE CHORD 69 (1973).
45. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577
F.2d 160, 168 n.17 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Howard &Hulbert, supra note 38,
at V-32. The aspects of this report regarding emotional conditioning are discussed in notes 92-93 and accompanying text infra. See also In re CocaCola Co., 83 F.T.C. 746, 804 (1973) (Commissioner Jones, dissenting).
[TJhe obvious implication [of the advertisement for "Hi-C"] with its
picturizations of fresh fruit and its constant use of words such as
natural flavor, fresh, etc., is to cause the consumer himself to make the
equivalency claim or association between Hi-C and citrus fruits. The
evidence makes clear that these equivalency claims are totally untrue....
46. See, e.g., Reed & Coalson, supra note 27; Kozyris, Advertising Intrusion: Assault on the Senses, Trespasson the Mind - A Remedy Through Separation, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 299 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Kozyris]; Note,
PsychologicalAdvertising: A New Area of F.T.C. Regulation, 1972 Wis. L.
REV.

1097.

47. See generally KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967); D. WALLECHmSKY& 1.
WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 852-53, (1975) [hereinafter cited as ALMANAC]; PROOF MUZAK Essential Now More than Ever! (pamphlet It A 62,
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Depending on the intentions of the designers of a particular program, the music may increase sales in supermarkets, 48 increase
the vigilance of military personnel, 49 or reduce the error rate in a
factory.5 0 To accomplish these goals, functional music programmers control and regulate such variables as pitch, tempo, and
the complexity of orchestration. Functional music programs are
frequently designed to reach periodic peaks, followed by periods
of silence. The precise patterns vary with the day of the week,
the hour of the day, and the particular result the music is
designed to accomplish. 5 1 While the music is patent, it "is arranged and recorded for its effectiveness on a secondary or sub' 52
conscious level.
The use of music to influence behavior is not new. One ancient use involved the practice of beating drums on a slave ship
available to potential customers from Muzak Corp.) [hereinafter cited as
PROOF!]: "MUZAK Stimulus Progression Programming is an intricate
process influenced by a number of factors including tempo, rhythm, instrumentation and size of orchestra; and to maintain control of stimulation, we
must identify and control these factors. This is why record albums and
other entertainment media are not employed by MUZAK." See also Why

Does MUZAK Record Its Own Music? (pamphlet available to potential customers from Muzak Corp.):

Each 15-minute segment of Muzak programming is planned to provide a
progressive stimulation. The musical selections are played starting
with the least stimulating and advancing to the selections that are most
stimulating. The objective is to provide a psychological/physiological
lift - a sense of forward movement which alleviates the undesirable effects of monotony, tension and fatigue. ... MUZAK is not in the entertainment business. MUZAK is a technique of contemporary
management (emphasis added).
Accord, Hamm v. Business Music, Inc., 282 Ala. 168, 209 So. 2d 663 (1968)
(functional music was not taxable as music or entertainment). The corporation successfully defended on the grounds that its music was not
designed to entertain, but to "condition customers and employees of subscribers by subliminally soothing tensions." Id. at 170,209 So. 2d at 664 (emphasis added).
48. ALMANAC, supra note 46, at 852.
49. HUMAN ENGINEERING LABORATORIES, ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND,
MARYLAND, U.S. ARMY, WORK PERFORMANCE wrrii Music: INSTRUMENTATION

AND FREQUENCY RESPONSE 20-1

(1968)

(Technical Memorandum 9-68,

AMCMS Code 5026.11.81900) (study also available to potential customers
from Muzak Corp.).
50. Case History, Mississippi Power & Light Co., Jackson, Mississippi
(study available to potential customers from Muzak Corp.).
51. Functional music is "highly specialized and directly adaptable to
subscribers' needs. . . ." Functional Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 274 F.2d 543, 545

(D.C. Cir. 1959); accord, KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 38 (C.D. Cal. 1967) "Musicast [a

functional music company] constantly acquires a great number of musical
recordings, and selects, edits and arranges the selections in a particular order. The type of music transmitted varies at different hours of the day and
even during different days of the week. The program is constantly changed
and improved."
52. PROOF!, note 47 supra.
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to help speed up the rowers.5 3 The ancient Romans and Greeks
used music to treat mental disorders. 54 Functional music
evolved from the discovery that marching music, played in factories during World War II, made for quicker and more efficient
production. This incidental discovery formed the basis for research which produced programs that provided greater and
more specialized control over moods and behavioral re55
sponses.
Common Feature

All sensory input is registered both consciously and subconsciously.56 The common feature of these subliminal techniques

is not that they influence the subconscious, but that they do so
intentionally. For this reason, subliminal messages are not protected speech for purposes of the First Amendment. Speech is
protected to the degree it conveys ideas, and is necessarily conscious.

57

53. ALMANAC, supra note 46, at 852.
54. M. CRrrCHLEY &R. HENSON, MUSIC AND THE BRAIN 434 (1977).
55. While Muzak Corporation provides studies showing functional music works, it will not provide detailed information showing how it works.
The use of music to modify behavior is, however, a distinct category of psychology called "musical therapy." See generally M. CRrrcHLEY &R. HENSON, Music AND THE BRAIN 433-45 (1977). For examples of musical therapy
experiments see McCarty, McElfresh, Rice, &Wilson, The Effect of Contingent Background Music on InappropriateBus Behavior, 15 J. Music
APY

THER-

150 (1978) (contingent music reduced fighting by emotionally disturbed

children on school bus); Furman, The Effect of Musical Stimuli on the
BrainwaveProductionof Children, 15 J. Music THERAPY 108 (1978) (investi-

gation of effect of music on brainwave patterns and retention of story material).
56. CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 19-20.
57. Subliminal influences can be divided into two categories for first
amendment purposes: those that are totally imperceptible except to the
subconscious (such as subliminal sounds and images), and those which are
consciously perceptible but have a secondary subliminal effect (such as
functional music and emotional conditioning). Communications that are
totally imperceptible except to the subconscious clearly lack the informational value that is the gist of first amendment protection. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L.REV. 1191, 1202
(1965). See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 183 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting, quoting with approval Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) ("[T]he ultimate good ... is better reached by free trade in
ideas .... [The first amendment] rests on the assumption that the widest

possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public. . .

.").

See also Virginia

Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1979), where
the court held that "[a Idvertising, however tasteless and excessive it some
times may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is
producing what product, for what reason, and at what price ....

[Tj he free

flow of commercial information is indispensable ...to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system. . .

."But

cf. Duggan, Fairnessin
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The courts have recognized that even constitutionally permissible speech may contain an impermissible subliminal effect.5 8 This subliminal effect may require judicial attention even
when unintentionally caused.5 9 Examining how the courts have
recognized this and other subliminal influences will help determine when subliminal techniques are wrongful and how they
can be regulated.
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION AND REGULATION

The common law has shown increasing sensitivity to increasingly intangible harms. Courts have progressed from requiring a showing of actual physical harm, 60 to requiring merely
a fear of physical harm, 61 to recognition of a cause of action for
emotional distress itself.62 The next logical step is judicial rec-

ognition that a person has a right to be protected from influences and harms which occur at a level below a person's
conscious awareness.
While the courts have recognized subliminal influence in a
variety of contexts, 63 they have yet to consider intentionally
caused subliminal influence as the basis of a cause of action in
tort.6 One great hindrance to judicial cognizance of such a
Advertising: In Pursuitof the Hidden Pursuaders,11 MELB. U. L. REV. 50,56
(1977) (noting that the true purpose of advertising is to persuade, and that
the goals of informing and informing for the purpose of selling are almost
antithetical).
When communications are perceptible but have secondary subliminal
effect, the first amendment analysis becomes more difficult. Protection
given to such speech should be balanced against the degree to which the
subliminal effect is intentionally caused. See, e.g., Zamora v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199, 206 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (court refused
to grant a cause of action for negligent infliction of subliminal injury by television networks on grounds that such a tort would cause an impermissible
interference with "television productions on the basis of content").
58. See notes 67-86 and accompanying text infra.
59. Id.
60. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 34-37 (discussing the tort of battery).
61. Id. at 37-41 (discussing the tort of assault).
62. Id. at 49-62.
63. In addition to those areas mentioned in text, see Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir.
1975) (trademark confusion case) "It is the subliminal confusion apparent
in the record as to the relationship, past and present, between the corporate
entities and the products that can transcend the competence of even the
most sophisticated consumer." Id. at 134, (citing with approval Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707,
717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)). See also People v. Guzman, 66 Cal. App. 3d 549, 559, 136
Cal. Rptr. 163, 169 (1977) (misconduct of juror had subliminal effect on jury
requiring mistrial).
64. But see Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199
(S.D. Fla. 1979) (allegation of negligent subliminal influence did not state
cause of action); Buchanan v. Greenwood Cinema, Civ. No. S76-471 (Sup.
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cause of action is the common law's reliance on eighteenth century legal doctrines. 65 These doctrines address misuse of media

66
directed towards beliefs at a rational, decisionmaking level.

They are adequate to recognize patent misuse of media, such as
advertising containing factual errors. These doctrines are, however, conceptually inadequate to recognize the subliminal use of
media which is designed to circumvent the mind's decisionmaking facilities. Before the law can protect against such media, it
must adopt legal doctrines which recognize that the mind's rational, decisionmaking facilities can be circumvented. The
adoption of legal doctrines evidencing this recognition has, in
part, occurred.
Recognition
The FairnessDoctrine

The "fairness doctrine" is a creation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and provides that, since the free
and open discussion of all controversial issues is in the public
interest, radio and television broadcasters must provide a "reasonable amount of time" to present opposing views. 67 Historically, this doctrine applied only to political speeches and
editorials. 68 In Banzaf v. Federal Communications Commis-

sion,69 however, it was applied to views subliminally expressed
in cigarette commercials.
In Banzaf, a private citizen requested free television time to
express his anti-cigarette smoking views. He claimed that cigarette smoking was a controversial issue and that cigarette commercials had implicitly expressed a pro-smoking view. 70 The
FCC agreed, 71 and the court of appeals affirmed, saying:
Ct. Hamilton County, Indiana, March 4, 1976), revenued as Civ. No. S781-318
(Sup. Ct., Marion County, Indiana) (case awaiting trial) (teenager who
fainted during a movie in which a subliminal technique was used brought
suit against ifim company).
65. Reed &Coalson, supra note 27, at 753, 760-61. For an example of how

the common law is still dependent on eighteenth century legal doctrines see
note 92 and accompanying text infra.

66. Reed & Coalson, supra note 27, at 754.
67. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 48 F.C.C.2d 1
(1974); see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (discussing the fairness doctrine and reviewing its history).
68. See generally Note, And Now a Word Against Our Sponsor: Ex-

tending The F.C.C.'s FairnessDoctrineto Advertising, 60 CALIF. L.REV. 1416
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Fairness].
69. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Inst. v.
FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
70. Id. at 1086.
71. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).
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In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen
who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart.
Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these
commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to
calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda,
which may be heard even ifnot listened to. ... 72
The court recognized that advertisements can convey information on a subliminal level. While cigarette advertisements
never explicitly stated "cigarettes make you happy and active,"
that message was nonetheless expressed clearly enough to raise
the fairness doctrine. The court examined not merely what the
advertisements said, but what psychological impact they had.
The application of the fairness doctrine to commercial advertising was short lived. After its successful use against other
advertising, 73 the FCC revised the doctrine so as to exclude
commercial advertisements. 74 In so doing, the Commission appeared to reject the holding in Banzaf, finding that "standard
product commercials, such as the old cigarette ads, make no
meaningful contribution toward informing the public on any
side of any issue. '75 This finding mistakes the lack of patent
content for the lack of any content at all. Since the Commission
still recognizes that subliminal expression of non-commercial issues should trigger the fairness doctrine, 76 the Commission's
position on the Banzaf case is inconsistent. Its finding was compelled by policy, since Banzaf and its progeny were threatening
77
to severely disrupt broadcast advertising.
Misleading Advertising
Recognition of subliminal influence has also occurred with
respect to misleading advertising. 78 Advertisements found to be
72. Banzaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (emphasis on
"avoid" by court, other emphasis added).
73. See Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (advertisements for high powered automobiles raised fairness doctrine for
commercials on ecological consequences of high gas usage); In re Esso, 71
F.C.C. 704 (1970) (commercial by oil company regarding exploration for oil
in Alaska raised fairness doctrine as to ecological consequences of exploration).
74. Compare In re Editoralizing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246
(1949) (codification of the fairness doctrine before revision) with Fairness
Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) (codification
after revision). See also Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d
1060 (1st Cir. 1975) (refusing to apply the fairness doctrine to a commercial
advertisement as a result of the revision).
75. Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24
(1974) (emphasis added).
76. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1064 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 1065; see generally Fairness,supra note 68, at 1422.
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"misleading" may be enjoined. To determine that an advertisement is misleading, the courts have adopted legal doctrines that
recognize that the mind's rational,, decisionmaking facilities can
be circumvented.

For instance, an advertisement's impact is measured not on
the "reasonable man" but on the "ordinary purchaser." 7 9 This
hypothetical creature is described as irrational, sub-intelligent,
and subject to "impressions. ' 80 This standard implicitly recognizes that the seeming illogic in much consumer behavior is the
product of subliminal influence.
To detect advertisements that are misleading because of
their subliminal content, courts recognize that "a statement acknowledged to be literally true and grammatically correct nevertheless [may have] a tendency to mislead, confuse or
deceive." 81 Courts recognize that this "tendency to mislead" is
intentionally caused. 82 This raises the practical problem of determining how an advertisement that is patently accurate and
proper can be found to be misleading and subliminally wrongful.
One solution is to view an advertisement in its entirety, considering its aural and pictorial aspects. This solution focuses
not on the accuracy of what an advertisement says but on the
78. This rule applies to the Lanham Trademark Act and to the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The Lanham Trademark Act provides in relevant
part: "Any person who shall affix ... Ito] any goods... a false description
...and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce. . .shall
be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality...
who] is likely to be damaged by the use of the false description." 15 U.S.C.
1125(a) (1970).
The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce" and provides administrative machinery for enjoining "false advertising." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Both Acts give a manufacturer whose product is being disparaged a practical means to enjoin the
offending advertisement. Courts apply the same principles to cases under
both Acts to determine whether an advertisement is "misleading." Compare American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson, 577 F.2d 160 (2d
Cir. 1978) (based on Lanham Act) with FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963) (based on the FTC Act). These principles are described in
notes 81-85 and accompanying text infra.
79. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
80. Id.

81. American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp.
1352, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369 (10th
Cir. 1943).
82. "Advertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although
every sentence separately considered is literally true. This may be because
advertisements are composed or purposely printedin such a way as to mis-

lead." Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 188 (1948) (emphasis added). See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson, 577 F.2d 160,
168 (2d Cir. 1978) (internal memorandum of an advertising firm showed
awareness of subliminal effect).
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cumulative impression of its parts working together.83 Another
solution is to disregard the advertisement and consider instead
the effect it produces. 84 Rather than concern themselves with
how a subliminal effect is produced, courts have sought to determine only that there is such an effect. The determination is accomplished by tests of consumer reactions. 85 In one case where
a consumer test was used to determine that an advertisement
was misleading, the court said: "What the [consumer] test
shows, then, is the powerful 'subliminal' influence of modern advertisements ....
The subliminal influence is present even
though-incredibly enough-the survey showed 46% of the people tested found something in the commerical 'hard to believe.' "86
Regulation
While advertisements may be enjoined because their subliminal content makes them "misleading," subliminal techniques have never been outlawed.8 7 Although both the FCC and
83. For example, in American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson,
577 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1978), the court analyzed an advertisement for aspirin in the context of its sound track (the sound of a muted kettle drum grew
louder while in the background a voice enumerated types of pain). The
court also noted the visual effect of "pulsating spots." Id. at 166. See also
American Brands, Inc., v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting allegations that a cigarette package was shown at an
angle, "creating and intended to create the impression that the cigarette is
larger than shown.").
84. "It is ... well established that the truth or falsity of the advertisement usually should be tested by the reactions of the public." American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d at 165. See also FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972) (in determining whether a
practice is unfair to consumers, the FTC is to function "like a court of equity," considering "public values"). 405 U.S. at 242. Accord, Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (finding constitutional a statute that allows a householder an absolutely subjective standard
for determining which mail is offensive).
85. 577 F.2d at 167-68 (use of a consumer test was appropriate); American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (advertisement was not proven misleading because insufficient consumer testing was done). Cf. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948), overruled in part by Monsanto Chem. Co. v.
Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
942 (1966). The dissent suggests use of subjective reactions from the audience for whom the advertisement was intended. Psychological testing is
also recommended. See also In re Coca Cola Co., 83 F.T.C. 746, 802 (1973)
(Commissioner Jones, dissenting, basing his opinions in part on a consumer survey). Consumer surveys are also used in trademark infringement
cases. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &
Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341 (2d Cir. 1975).
86. 577 F.2d at 168, n.17.
87. When the use of subliminal techniques was first widely discussed in
the mid-1950's, several bills were introduced in Congress but were never
passed. See CLAM-PLATE, supra note 13, at 132-49; Subliminal Advertising
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the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have power to regulate
some uses of such techniques, their attempts to regulate have
88
been minimal.
The FTC is empowered to stop advertising that is "unfair or
deceptive." 89 While subliminal techniques are not deceptive, 90
they are arguably unfair and there has been some attempt to
regulate them on that basis. 91 Conversely, the FTC has also considered regulating emotional. conditioning on the basis that advertisements using such techniques are deceptive. The
rationale is that product claims are deceptive unless they can be
substantiated. The advertiser in the aforementioned "Vivarin"
example, for instance, made two claims: that Vivarin would increase alertness and would give the user a better, more sexually
fulfilling life. Under this rationale, both these claims would be
the
evaluated. If they could not both be substantiated, then
92
.commercial would be deceptive and could be enjoined.
Both the FTC and FCC have recently considered rules to
control and limit advertising directed towards children. 93 These
in American BroadcastMedia 14 (April 1978) (student project prepared for
United States Senator Wendell Anderson by S. Jones and available from
Yale Legislative Services) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Services].
88. The FTC is empowered to regulate advertising, and the FCC is empowered to regulate broadcast media. Neither of these agencies have jurisdiction over independent commercial use of subliminal techniques. They
could not, for instance, enjoin a supermarket from playing subaudible taped
voices whispering "Don't steal!" For a discussion of that technique, see
notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
90. But see In re Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception" Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 1017 (1974) ("such [subliminal]
broadcasts are clearly intended to be deceptive").
91. See generally Note, Unfairness Without Deception: Recent Positions
of the FederalTrade Commission, 5 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 537 (1974); Note, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act - Unfairness to Consumers,

1972 Wis. L.REV. 1071.
92. Howard & Hulbert, note 38 supra, at V-32:
The toothpaste advertiser who claims that regular use of "Whizzwhite"
produces teeth 25 percent brighter than any competitive brand should
only do so if the claim is true and supported. If he then claims people
. and that the same white teeth produce a 25 perwill like you more
cent higher rate of job promotions . .. why should the notion of substantiation be less applicable?
This approach misses the point. Substantiation is valuable when a claim is
made that might rationally be believed. The danger is not that purchasers
of "Whizzwhite" will expect to become more popular, but that they will become emotionally conditioned to buy "Whizzwhite" irrespective of their expectations.
93. The FTC published proposed regulations in 43 Fed. Reg. 17967 (April
27, 1978). An attempt to get interlocutory review of the regulations failed.
Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The
FCC formulated specific policies to be followed by television broadcasters.
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974),
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rules are a product of the law's historical sensitivity to the effects of advertising on children 94 and other particularly vulnerable segments of the population. 95 The rationale of these rules
would support similar restrictions on the use of subliminal techniques. Since these techniques are designed to bypass the
mind's critical faculties, persons of all ages are vulnerable to
them.
The FCC has declared that the use of subliminal sounds or
images in broadcast media is contrary to the public interest9 6
and is "inconsistent with the obligations of a licensee. '97 Such
techniques are now also proscribed by the National Association
of Broadcasters' Television Code. 98 Subliminal images have
been broadcast despite these prohibitions. 99 However, it is difficult to know whether additional, unreported broadcasts have occurred since ordinarily broadcasts of subliminal images cannot
be consciously perceived and cannot therefore be the subject of
a television viewer's complaint. 10 0
The FCC also regulates functional music that is broadcast
by radio waves.' 0 ' FCC regulations require all radio stations to
broadcast a varied program content to the general public, some
recon. denied, 55 F.C.C.2d 691 (1975), affd sub nom., Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). These policies included lim-

its to the number of commercials that could be shown children, a requirement that program and commercial content be clearly separated, and a
prohibiton of practices that take advantage of the immaturity of children.
50 F.C.C.2d at 19. The effectiveness of these policies was recently reviewed.
Children's Programming and Advertising Practices, 68 F.C.C.2d 1344, 1353
(1978). See generally Note, Unsafe for Little Ears? The Regulation of
BroadcastAdvertising to Children, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1131 (1978).
94. See, e.g., FTC v. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). See also
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 732 (1970) (noting
Congressional concern on the impact of obscene materials on children).
95. See, e.g., S.S.S. Co. v. FTC, 416 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1969) (advertisements aimed at the poor); Doris Savitch, 50 F.T.C. 828 (1954), affid, 218 F.2d
817 (2d Cir. 1955) (special appeal to women who fear they are pregnant).
96. In re Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception"
Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 1017 (1974).
97. Id.
98. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
99. In re Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal Perception"
Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016, 1017 (1974) (noting, that on one occasion, television stations continued to broadcast a commercial containing subliminal
statements even after being told not to by the National Association of
Broadcasters TV Code Authority).
100. Subliminal flashes may be as fleeting as 1/3000th of a second. B.
KEY, SUBLIMINAL SEDUCTION 33 (1973). Presumably, the FCC will receive
complaints only when, for some reason, flashes of a much longer duration
are used.
101. Some functional music is transmitted over telephone lines. See
Hamm v. Business Music, Inc., 282 Ala. 168, 209 So.2d 663 (1968).
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of which must include the spoken word.'0 2 To achieve the desired subliminal effect, functional music programs must be
broadcast without interruptions. 10 3 In order to comply with
FCC rules, functional music broadcasters devised a system
whereby the public could receive functional music with the requisite minimal content and private subscribers would rent a device whereby that content could be deleted.'0
In 1955 the FCC, having found that functional music "is
highly specialized and directly adaptable to [a] subscriber's
needs [and is] formulated in their interest rather than that of
the general public,'10 5 banned broadcast of functional music to
the public. Private subscribers were still permitted to receive
functional music by the use of special equipment. 10 6 Broadcast
ended, whether or not minimum
to the public was effectively
10 7
added.
was
content
The FCC's ruling was challenged. In Functional Music v.
Federal Communications Commission, 0 8 a functional music
broadcaster sought the right to broadcast as long as the minimal
content requirements were met. The court held for the broadcaster, and noted that, despite the Commission's assertion that
functional music was not intended for the public, the commercial broadcasts had in fact been popular. The court said "functional music can be, and is, of interest to the general radio
audience."'10 9
In Functional Music, the court stressed that the people
freely listened to the music. 110 The court's characterization may
not have been correct, since the radio audience consented to listen to music, not functional music. They were not aware that
their moods and heartbeats were being altered in preconceived
patterns by functional music psychologists. Perhaps if the court
had identified the interest being invaded by functional music, it
would not have permitted commercial broadcast. The court ex102. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4210 (1979). Regarding FCC policies see generally 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.4000-.4275 (1979). See also KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Cigarette Vendors Corp., 264 F. Supp. 35, 37 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
103. 264 F. Supp. at 37.
104. Id.
105. Functional Music v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The FCC
found that functional music was not "broadcasting" for purposes of the
Communications Act. "Broadcasting means the dissemination of radio
communication intended to be received by the public. . . ." Id. at 545 n.3.
106. This equipment allowed multiplex transmission by which the same
FM radio channel could broadcast multiple signals, only one of which could
be received by the public. Id. at 545.
107. Id. at 545-46.
108. 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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plicitly left this possibility open in holding that "[w]hether or
not [a] functional music service may be barred as objectionable
for reasons other than its [supposedly not being intended for
the public] . ..is not before us. We merely conclude that the
reasons which the Commission relies upon do not support its
action in barring functional music."''
TOWARDS A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Privacy Law

A variety of causes of action may be available to the victim
of subliminal influence." 2 Of these, an action in privacy is most
applicable. A privacy interest was formally recognized in the
twentieth century," 3 and stated most eloquently, is the right to
be "let alone.""14 This right takes two forms. 115 One form involves publicity, in which some private fact is exposed either by
commercial packaging" 6 or by the news media." 7 Another form
111. Id. at 548-49.
112. One theory would premise a consumer cause of action under the
FTC's "unfair or deceptive" clause. This theory uses the doctrine of implication, and has proven largely unsuccessful in this area. See generally Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 663 (1970). Compare
Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (finding a consumer
cause of action could be implied) with Greenberg v. Michigan Optometric
Ass'n, 483 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (finding there was no such cause of
action). See also Kozyris, supra note 46, at 337. (suggesting privacy, nusiance, and public interest in the media as applicable theories).
One interesting contractual theory is undue influence. Undue influence
requires "influence" sufficient to create or alter a contract, and requires that
the influence be "undue." Where the influence was not caused by a person
in a confidential relationship, it must be shown that the free agency of the
injured person was overcome. See, e.g., Federman v. Stanwyck, 63 Ohio 78,
108 N.E.2d 339 (1949). Undue influence could be used, for instance, to avoid
a contract for the sale of a car on the grounds that the purchaser was unduly influenced by the functional music being played in the dealership
showroom.
113. Privacy law has been traced to the famous article by Earl Warren &
Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.L. REV. 193 (1890).
114. Id. at 193.
115. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 814. Prosser identifies four forms of
privacy, but notes that three forms require or usually involve publicity
whereas the fourth form, intrusion, does not. The classification of privacy
interests suggested here is a variant of Prosser's. See also Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) ('The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,
and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."). For an analysis of privacy cases that reject Prosser's
classification see Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964) [hereinafter cited as

Bloustein].
116. The classical case is where a photograph of the plaintiff's face has
been used without his consent to advertise the defendant's product. See,
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involves "intrusion upon seclusion."' 18 It is from this form that
the victim of subliminal influence- may find a cause of action.
Actionable "intrusion" originally involved a physical intrusion upon a plaintiff's place of solitude." 9 The notion of intrusion has since been applied in situations where there was a nonphysical intrusion, 120 and more recently where the intrusion
was to the plaintiff's thought processes alone. 12 1 This latter variant is called mental privacy, and protects against interference in
22
The
a person's moods or thoughts against that person's will.'
common feature of the intrusion cases is that the actionable
wrong is not the publicity associated with private facts but
rather the invasion itself.
The Expectation Interest
Non-physical intrusions have been found where a person's
legitimate expectation of privacy was violated. The expectation
interest was defined by Katz v. United States.123 In Katz, the
FBI monitored and recorded the telephone conversations a suspected criminal had while in a public phone booth. The court
held that the FBI's actions had violated the suspect's privacy,
and enunciated a two part test. 24 First, "a person must have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.' 25 Second, the expectation must be one "that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' 126 This test would find the use of
subliminal techniques to be an invasion of privacy if, for example, consumers expect, and reasonably so, that they will know
when they are being manipulated or influenced.
e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Eick v. Perk
App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952).
Dog Food Co., 347 M11.
117. Publicity is required, although it need not be through the aegis of
the news media. E.g., Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App.2d 207, 127
P.2d 577 (1942) (distribution of a letter to a thousand men was held sufficient publicity).
118. See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at 807-09.
119. Id.
120. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound can invade privacy).
121. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978); Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County,
Mich., July 10, 1973), reprinted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 2063-64 (July 31, 1973).

122. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
123. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
124. 389 U.S. at 361 (Justice Harlan, concurring). The two part test has
since been adopted by the Court. Smith v. State of Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979).

125. Id.
126. Id.
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Freedom To Not Hear
Non-physical intrusions have also been found in the use of
sound. The Supreme Court recognizes that the privacy interest
encompasses a "very basic right to be free from sights, sounds,
and tangible matter that we do not want."'1 27 This right "not to
be spoken to"' 28 is balanced against the inevitability of unwanted speech and other stimuli received by merely walking
outdoors. The balance tips in favor of finding a protectable privacy interest when offending stimuli invade the home 129 or affect an otherwise "captive audience."
An audience is "captive" when it is powerless to avoid an
offending communication. 130 Thus an ordinance making it illegal to drive around in a sound truck, blaring amplified
speeches, 13' was found constitutionally valid, as was a state statute forbidding all advertising of cigarettes on billboards. 132 Regarding billboards, the Supreme Court said "[b]illboards, street
car signs, and placards and such are in a class by them[They] are constantly before the eyes of observers
selves ....
on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the exercise
of choice or volition on their part. Other forms of advertising are
ordinarily3 seen as a matter of choice on the part of the ob3
server."1
Privacy is invaded, then, when a person cannot choose to
avoid an offending communication. By this test, aural rather
than visual communication is more likely to cause an invasion,
since one can stop looking more easily than one can stop hearing.' 34 In no event, however, can one stop one's perception of
127. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
128. See generally Haiman, Speech v. Privacy. Is There A Right Not To Be

To? 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1972). See also Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 191 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1951), rev'd 343 U.S. 451 (1952) ("Freedom
Spoken

of attention, which forced listening destroys, is a part of liberty essential to
"); Note, Freedomof Attention, 2 CATH.U. L.
individuals and to society .
REV. 84 (1952).
129. 397 U.S. at 738.
130. Compare Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (finding householders are captive to the mail they receive and can
therefore be protected from the receipt of unwanted mail) with Erznoznik
v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance
that made it an offense to show films containing nudity at a drive-in movie
theater where the screen was visible from a public street). In Erznoznik
the Court said "the screen of a drive-in theater is not 'so obtrusive as to
make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.'" Id.
at 212.
131. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
132. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
133. Id. at 110.
134. The privacy of bus passengers was not contingent on their ability "to
sit and to try not to listen." Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469
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subliminal phenomena, unless the offending source can be identified and circumvented. The pervasiveness of subliminal influences may make this impossible. 135 Functional music
particularly involves captive audiences because of its common
use in elevators, restaurants, retail stores, and in the work
136
place.
Zamora's Subliminal Tort
The first attempt at a private cause of action for subliminal
influence was made by a minor, Ronny Zamora, who was convicted of first degree murder. At trial he had unsuccessfully
pleaded an insanity defense based on "involuntary subliminal
television intoxication."'137 Zamora then brought a civil action
against the three major television networks 138 for causing him to
be involuntarily addicted to and "completely subliminally intoxicated by" the extensive viewing of the television violence they
had broadcast. 139 The complaint was phrased in negligence, alleging that the broadcasters had failed to use ordinary care to
prevent Zamora from being "impermissibly stimulated, incited
and instigated"'14 to duplicate the violence he had watched. The
141
complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
A number of factors influenced the court's decision, among
them: that a duty was not articulated; 1' that the element of causation was lacking; 143 and that the complaint required an imper(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Hts., 418
U.S. 298, 320 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Kozyris, supra note 46, at 301-03 (describing in detail the number
and types of daily advertising intrusions). The courts have been flexible in
deciding what media is actionable. Compare Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S.
105, 110 (1932) ("The radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard or
street car placard") with note 62 and accompanying text supra.
136. "Employees during working hours are the classic captive audience."
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357, 368 (1958) (Warren,
J., dissenting).
137. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978). The relevant test for insanity was the M'Naughten Rule, which required the inability to distinguish right and wrong at the time of the criminal act. Id. at 779.
The "subliminal" defense was heard by the jury without the benefit of expert testimony directed to the effect of television on adolescents. Such testimony was excluded on relevancy grounds, in that the expert would have
been unable to testify that the effect included the inability to distinguish
right and wrong. Id.
138. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.
Fla. 1979) (The other two networks sued were American Broadcasting Co.,
Inc., and National Broadcasting Co., Inc.).
139. Id. at 200.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 207.
142. Id. at 202.
143. Id. at 204 (court analyzed the chain of causation as "at some point
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missible judicial meddling in television programming content in
contravention of the first amendment. 144 The court, however,
expressed sympathy for the attempt to state a cause of action.
The court suggested that it would be more inclined to grant a
cause of action if the plaintiff would allege that he had reacted to
"any specific program of an inflammatory nature."' 45 "One day,"
the court concluded, "medical or other sciences with or without
the cooperation of the programmers may convince the FCC or
the courts that the delicate balance of first amendment rights
should be altered to permit some additional limitations in pro1 46
gramming."'
The failure of the Zamora court to recognize a private cause
of action for the victim of subliminal influence is not surprising.
The case had a number of special problems that made it a poor
vehicle for such recognition. 147 In light of the privacy law principles discussed, the victim of a subliminal tort does not share
Zamora's difficulty in establishing the element of causation.
The victim need only prove the occurrence of the invasion it(unspecified in any way) he became captive to the violence he viewed and
turned to unlawful conduct.").
144. Id.
145. Id. The court dismissed the complaint only "[u]pon the election of
the plaintiffs not to amend." Id. at 207.
146. Id. at 206.
147. These problems are described in notes 142-43 and accompanying
text supra. Cf. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107
Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973). In Stevens, the defendant drug company promoted a
drug by encouraging physicians to prescribe it. The plaintiff was injured by
the drug, and sued both the drug company and the prescribing doctor on
the grounds that the drug label contained inadequate warnings. Both the
doctor and the drug company were found liable. The drug company appealed, arguing that the drug warning label was clearly adequate and that
the prescribing doctor was aware of the warning but nevertheless prescribed the drug. 9 Cal. 3d at 64, 507 P.2d at 660-61, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 52. The
court rejected these arguments, finding that the desired result of the drug
company's promotions was to subliminally influence physicians to prescribe the drug irrespective of the warning label. 9 Cal. 3d at 69, 507 P.2d at
664, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The court said:
[tIhe record reveals in abundant detail that [the drug company]
made every effort employing both direct and subliminaladvertising, to
allay the fears of the medical profession which were raised by knowledge of the drug's dangers. It cannot be said, therefore, that Dr. Beland's prescription of the drug despite his awareness of its dangers was
anything other than the foreseeable consequence-indeed the desired
result-of [the drug company's] overpromotion.
9 Cal. 3d at 69, 507 P.2d at 664, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The court also said
that "[iIt is reasonable to assume that the company's efforts consciously or
subconsciously influenced him." 9 Cal. 3d at 68, 507 P.2d at 664, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 55.
The doctor in Stevens did not appeal. He should have pleaded "the subliminal defense." Unlike Zamora, the acts that were alleged to have a subliminal effect were intentional, thus providing a stronger basis for the court
to provide relief.
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self,1' and need not prove the highly attenuated relationship
between watching television and becoming incarcerated. The
victim need not demonstrate a breach of duty because, as in privacy, the tort requires an intentional act. 14 9 Most fundamentally, the victim of a subliminal tort need not become embroiled
in a discussion of "the delicate balance of first amendment
rights"' 50 since subliminal messages are not protected
speech.' 9'
The Subliminal Tort
Once the problems of the Zamora case can be overcome,
the remaining problem is to determine the elements of a subliminal tort. Privacy law provides a sound conceptual basis for such
a tort, but has yet to adopt the legal doctrines that recognize the
subconscious as a separate protectable interest. 5 2 Such recognition is a prerequisite of a cause of action for purely subliminal
injuries. Accordingly, the subliminal tort may be derived in part
from privacy law, and in part from those non-tort areas (such as
the fairness doctrine and misleading advertising cases) that
have recognized the subconscious. Thus formulated, a subliminally injured person should be required to prove three elements:
1) that a subliminal invasion has occurred;
2) that the subliminal invasion was intentional; and
3
3) that the invasion was wrongful.'5
Proof of an invasion can be accomplished by the same techniques used in misleading advertising cases. One technique involves the examination of an offending communication in its
entirety, considering its aural and pictorial aspects. 5 4 This
148. See notes 119-22 and accompanying text supra. The rationale is expresed by Bloustein, supra note 117, at 973:
The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality
as including the right to be free from certain types of intrusions. This
measure of personal isolation and personal control over the conditions

of its abandonment is of the very essence of personal freedom and dig-

nity, is part of what our culture means by these concepts.
149. See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at 802-18.
150. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199, 207
(S.D. Fla. 1979).
151. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
152. See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
153. Cf. Behavior Control, supra note 15, at 262-63. The author proposes
factors to be considered in determining when psychological treatment that
changes mentation is intrusive. The proposed factors include: (i) the extent to which the change is reversible; (ii) the extent to which the resultant
psychic state is "unnatural" (related to the magnitude of change); (iii) the
extent to which the change can be resisted; and (iv) the duration of the
change.
154. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
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would be useful in showing the use of subliminal embeds in still
pictures 155 and the use of inappropriate associations with examples of emotional conditioning. The other technique involves
disregarding the offending communication, and using survey
and other scientific evidence to show that the communication
produced a subliminal effect.' 5 6 Such evidence would be useful
to show, for instance, that an advertisement was repeated a sufficient number of times to cause conditioning that would influence behavior. In the case of functional music, psychological
studies have been used non-judicially to show that music does
modify behavior. 5 7 Similar studies could be used by a plaintiff
or a class of plaintiffs to show that their behavior was modified.
The use of science, such as would be required, is no stranger to
15 8
the courtroom.
Proof of intent can be accomplished by the same techniques
that are used in proving other intentional torts. In the misleading advertising cases, for instance, proof of intent is not required
but has nonetheless sometimes been found. 15 9 The element of
intent serves also to avoid the proof problems that appeared
with the use of negligence in the Zamora case, and serves to
narrow the range of actionable speech.
Proof that the invasion was wrongful can be accomplished
by showing that the invasion was an attempt to modify behavior.
The intent to control a person without his awareness is inherently wrongful. To determine whether a particular subliminal
invasion is wrongful the cases defining the expectation interest
provide guidelines. 160 Following these guidelines, the subliminal victim can show an actual expectation of privacy.' 61 The
155. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra. Embeds may also be
susceptible to detection by computer image enhancement. Legislative
Services, supra note 87, at 39.
156. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text supra. Subliminal techniques would be actionable even if they had other than their intended effect. -Voices whispering "Don't Steal!," for example, might not reduce theft
in a particular situation but could still invade one's subconscious and cause
unpredictable, even violent reactions. See Legislative Services, supra note
87, at 7-8 (subliminal stimuli evoked pathological manifestations); OmNI,

Feb., 1981, at 107 (subliminal stimulus of innocuous phrase causes violent
reaction). Evidence of a subliminal effect can be shown even in the absence
of such dramatic reactions. See The Psychological Unconscious,supra note
13, at 427-28 (effects of subliminal stimuli are detectable through word as-

sociations and analysis of dream content).
157. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
158. On the technical competence of the courts see Behavior Control,
supra note 15, at 323-24.
159. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra.
161. See note 125 and accompanying text supra. This is not to say that
actual knowledge of the use of a subliminal technique (by, for instance, the
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court could then determine whether the expectation was one
1 62
that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
Whether it is reasonable to expect to be free from subliminal
influence is a policy question.
The Policy Question
Defining when a subliminal invasion is objectively wrongful
will require drawing fine distinctions. A supermarket manager
may discover that by painting his walls a certain color, he will
improve the atmosphere of his store and will accordingly improve sales. While this use of color operates and is intended to
operate on a subliminal level, it cannot be said to be unreasonable. If, however, the manager installs a system of speakers that
subaudibly whisper "Buy eggs!,"'1 63 his behavior is unreasonable. Between these examples may be other cases more difficult
to decide. 6 4 The resolution ultimately depends on an emotional
test: would a reasonable person, discovering that his or her behavior had been manipulated without personal knowledge, feel
an instinctual sense of anger, revulsion, or fear? Reasonable
people may come to different conclusions.
The question remains whether all techniques to influence
subliminally should be prohibited. If subaudible voices whispering "Don't steal!" can reduce shoplifting in a supermarket,
the use of such a technique will be economically attractive.
Likewise, there is great incentive to use functional music proposting of a sign) will necessarily obviate liability. In certain circumstances
the subliminal assault may be unavoidable (such as exposure to functional
music programs used in elevators). The actual expectation of privacy must
be considered in light of the plaintiff's helplessness to avoid the offending

communication. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (balancing
the right to use sound trucks against the helplessness of listeners to escape
interference with their privacy).
162. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.

163. The use of subliminal messages to sell has been called "inevitable."
Sept., 1978, at 24. Whether such use is already widespread is a matter of conjecture. Among other uses, subliminals are being used to inspire
sales personnel and to help people lose weight. TIME, Sept. 10, 1979, at 71.
164. In his famous essay, On Liberty, John Stuart Mill wrote:
There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against
encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs,
as protection against despotism.
But although this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question, where to place the limit-how to
make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be
MONEY,

done ....
MILL, ON LIBERTY

7-8 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).
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grams which increase factory workers' efficiency 65 and reduce
166
their error rate.
Are these techniques inherently wrongful? The answer is
that these uses of subliminal stimuli are no more appropriate
than use, for instance, to influence a voter's choice of a candidate. 167 The invasion of privacy occurs whether or not the objective behavior modification has social utility. 1 68 Even the
seemingly beneficial effects may be ultimately destructive. A
society that must function by the use of subliminal stimuli
rather than the conscious willingness of its people is bound to
become unstable.
CONCLUSION

The discovery of new media techniques for the modification
of the behavior of persons without their awareness raises the
specter of a society whose freedom has become an illusion. No
clear regulatory or common law prohibitions exist against most
of these techniques. Nevertheless, a clear movement of the law
indicates a growing sensitivity to the concept and the pervasivness of subliminal influences, and to the companion notion that
such influences are primafacie offensive.
Firmly established principles of privacy and non-tort law, in
tandem, provide the basis for individual victims of subliminal
influence to seek a remedy. It is through the efforts of such individuals that the courts can decide which subliminal media techniques are being used, and which are wrongful and must be
stopped.
Charles B. Kramer

165. Case study, Effect of MUZAK on Industrial Efficiency 14-18 (1964)
(study available to potential customers from Muzak Corp.).

166. See note 50 supra.
167. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
168. Regarding radio on public buses, Justice Douglas wrote: 'The gov-

ernment may use the radio (or television) on public vehicles for many pur-

poses. Today it may use it for a cultural end. Tomorrow it may use it for

political purposes. So far as the right of privacy is concerned the purpose
makes no difference .... Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone." Public
Util. Comm'n v. Pollak,

343 U.S.

451, 468-69 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

